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7Drivers of Collaboration in Political Decision
Making: A Cross-Sector Perspective
Manuel Fischer, Eawag and University of Berne
Pascal Sciarini, University of GenevaCollaboration between actors in political decision-making processes is crucial from both an actor and a process per-
spective. Previous studies have highlighted the role of preference similarity, power, and opportunity structures as
drivers of collaboration. However, these studies have focused on single policy sectors and have therefore overlooked
possible differences in effects across sectors, as well as interactions between sectors. This article innovates by taking a
cross-sector perspective. Applying exponential random graph models to collaboration networks covering 11 decision-
making processes, we show that relational opportunity structures have a fairly consistent inﬂuence on collaboration,
whereas the effects of social and institutional opportunity structures vary across processes. The effect of institutional
opportunity structures is contingent on the importance of institutional arenas. Our hypothesis on cross-sector inﬂu-
ences receives partial support. Opportunity structures and interactions between sectors add to preference similarity and
power, which have a strong and robust inﬂuence on collaborative tie formation.olitical actors such as interest groups, parties, or admin-
istrative agencies collaborate during decision-making
processes in order to translate their goals into policy.
From an actor-level perspective, collaboration with other
actors is crucial. It helps to exchange information regarding
the issue at stake, to gain access to resources, to form co-
alitions, and, ultimately, to inﬂuence policy outputs. From
the perspective of a political decision-making process, col-
laboration favors the emergence of trust among actors
(Berardo 2009; Lubell 2007) and is beneﬁcial to effective
compromise seeking and problem solving in governance
networks (Schneider et al. 2003). Given the central role that
collaboration between political actors plays, it is of utmost
importance to understand the factors that drive collabora-
tion.
Earlier studies have shown that preference similarity,
functional interdependence, or perceived power is an im-
portant predictor of collaboration (e.g., Gerber, Henry, and
Lubell 2013; König and Bräuninger 1998; Zafonte and Sa-Manuel Fischer (manuel.ﬁscher@eawag.ch) is a researcher at the Department of E
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All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms batier 1998). Leifeld and Schneider (2012) have added in-
stitutional, social, and relational opportunity structures to
the list. Collaboration not only is beneﬁcial to actors but also
implies transaction costs (Lubell et al. 2002). Opportunity
structures help actors to choose contacts that minimize trans-
action costs while maximizing outreach.
Yet, existing studies of collaboration between political
actors suffer from a shortcoming: they usually focus on sin-
gle policy sectors, such as toxic chemicals control (Leifeld
and Schneider 2012), water management (Berardo 2013;
Schneider et al. 2003; Zafonte and Sabatier 1998), labor pol-
icy (König and Bräuninger 1998), or regional planning (Ger-
ber et al. 2013). Therefore, they are likely to overlook two
important elements. First, it is acknowledged that the pat-
terns of collaboration vary across policy sectors, depending
on the characteristics of these sectors (Weible 2005, 473).
Focusing on a single policy sector prevents the identiﬁcation
of possible differences in the drivers of collaboration from
one sector to another. To be conﬁdent in the validity ofnvironmental Social Sciences at the Swiss Institute for Aquatic Science and
Political Science at the University of Berne, Switzerland. Pascal Sciarin
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a variety of sectors (Henry 2011, 367; Weible and Sabatier
2005, 195). Second, sector-speciﬁc studies fail to take into
account possible interactions across sectors. Interactions be-
tween policy sectors can be important but are most often
ignored in the literature (Hoberg and Morawski 2008; Jones
and Jenkins-Smith 2009).
This article takes a comparative perspective across pol-
icy sectors. We make three contributions. First, we put the
ﬁndings of earlier studies regarding opportunity structures
and other drivers of collaboration to a more challenging
test. Second, we examine whether the effects of institutional
opportunity structures on collaborative tie formation vary
depending on process-related characteristics. Third, we in-
novate by looking at interactions across sectors. In a po-
litical system, many decision-making processes develop in
parallel and contemporaneously, actors have multiplex re-
lations, and the creation of collaborative ties in a policy sec-
tor is likely inﬂuenced by collaboration established in other
sectors (Shrestha, Berardo, and Feiock 2014; Shrestha and
Feiock 2009).
Because political actors collaborate with several other ac-
tors at the same time, we adopt a network perspective. Our
empirical tests are based on a unique data set of collabo-
ration networks covering the 11 most important decision-
making processes in Switzerland in the early 2000s. Net-
work data on multiple policy sectors are rare in political
science (Lubell, Henry, and McCoy 2010; Lubell et al. 2012;
Scholz, Berardo, and Kile 2008, 397). Our data were gath-
ered through interviews with representatives of 251 collec-
tive political actors participating in these 11 processes, which
each corresponds to a speciﬁc policy sector.1 To analyze the
data, we run exponential random graph models (ERGMs).
Unlike standard regression models, ERGMs are able to take
into account the speciﬁc dependence structure of network
data.
In the theoretical section, we ﬁrst discuss the importance
of collaboration for political decision making in general and
for political actors in particular. We then review the various
drivers of collaboration. On the basis of that, we develop
our argument regarding the likely differences between pro-
cesses and the role of interactions across processes. The next
section presents the data, the method, and the model and1. In the existing literature the terms policy sector, policy domain, and
policy subsystem are all used to describe a set of related policy issues and
actors that engage in politics around these issues (e.g., Sabatier and Weible
2007). In this article, we use the term policy sector. In addition, given that
our empirical material stems from 11 decision-making processes corre-
sponding each to a speciﬁc policy sector, we use “processes” and “sectors”
interchangeably.
This content downloaded from 130.092.
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms sets the stage for empirical tests. In conclusion, we highlight
the broader implications of our ﬁndings.
COLLABORATION AMONG POLITICAL ACTORS
On the level of political decision-making processes, col-
laboration among actors encourages the emergence of trust,
facilitates coordination and communication, reduces incen-
tives for opportunism, and helps actors to overcome col-
lective action dilemmas (e.g., Feiock and Scholz 2010; Lubell
et al. 2002; Putnam 1995; Sabatier 1987; Schneider et al.
2003). Identifying the factors that drive collaboration is thus
crucial if one wishes to understand how political decision
making works—and how well it performs. On the level of
single collective political actors, such as political parties, in-
terest groups, or administrative ofﬁces, collaboration with
others helps them to translate their goals into policy. In modern
political systems, technical, ﬁnancial, and political resources are
fragmented, and no actor alone has enough resources to uni-
laterally inﬂuence political decision making (Schneider et al.
2003). Collaboration with other actors is therefore neces-
sary if actors want to inﬂuence policy outputs (Berardo and
Scholz 2010; Henry 2011).
Yet, establishing collaboration causes transaction costs
(Lubell et al. 2002; North 1990). Contacting other actors
and keeping up collaboration require time and resources.
Time and resources spent on collaboration with one actor
cannot be used for contacting another actor or for any
other activity. Given these transaction costs, political actors
cannot afford to collaborate with all other potentially rel-
evant actors but have to weigh the costs and beneﬁts of
establishing collaborative ties (Feiock et al. 2010; Feiock
and Scholz 2010; Leifeld and Schneider 2012; Lubell et al.
2002; Schneider et al. 2003). This trade-off might prevent
political actors from taking coordinated policy decisions
and from dealing with collective action problems (Berardo
and Scholz 2010; Feiock and Scholz 2010).
Preference similarity, perceived power, and formal au-
thority are the usual criteria that political actors may rely
on when deciding to establish collaborative contacts. First, to
increase their beneﬁts and achieve their policy goals, political
actors tend to collaborate with others with which they share
policy preferences (e.g., Henry 2011; Sabatier 1987; Weible
and Sabatier 2005; Zafonte and Sabatier 1998). Second, ac-
tors in search of information or allies tend to collaborate
with alters they see as powerful, since such contacts appear
as most promising in terms of inﬂuence (Henry 2011; Leifeld
and Schneider 2012; Stokman and Zeggelink 1996). Third,
for the same reason, actors also tend to collaborate with part-
ners such as state actors, which have formal authority over a
decision-making process (König and Bräuninger 1998).009.056 on November 25, 2016 05:39:50 AM
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and differences between sectors
To the same extent that actors attempt to increase their
beneﬁts by creating collaborative ties with powerful partners
or with partners with similar preferences, they may also use
opportunity structures to evaluate the costs and beneﬁts of
a new contact (Leifeld and Schneider 2012; Schneider et al.
2003). Opportunity structures have been used in the litera-
ture on network management (e.g., Klijn, Steijn, and Ede-
lenbos 2010), policy networks (Laumann and Pappi 1973),
or public policy (e.g., “coalition opportunity structures”;
Fischer 2015; Sabatier and Weible 2007). In line with Leifeld
and Schneider (2012), we conceive of opportunity structures
as either preexisting collaboration ties or institutional arenas
that actors may use to lower transaction and informational
costs and increase their conﬁdence that establishing a con-
tact is worth the effort. More speciﬁcally, we look at three
distinct forms of opportunity structures.
First, relational opportunity structures stem from pre-
existing communication channels between two actors that
favor the creation of additional ties between those actors
(Feiock and Scholz 2010; Granovetter 1985; Leifeld and
Schneider 2012; Putnam 1995). More speciﬁcally, if an ac-
tor a sends information to actor b, then actor b is likely to
reciprocate the tie and also send information to actor a.
Reciprocation, or the establishment of “bonding relations”
(Berardo and Scholz 2010), decreases the risk of defection
of the collaboration partner and provides a mutual deterrence
on which trust and credible commitments can develop (Be-
rardo 2009; Feiock et al. 2010; Shrestha and Feiock 2011).
Second, social opportunity structures refer to the exis-
tence of actors’ shared collaboration partners, which also
facilitates collaboration (Berardo and Scholz 2010; Car-
penter, Esterling, and Lazer 2004; Feiock and Scholz 2010;
Leifeld and Schneider 2012). Actors prefer to collaborate
with those they already know indirectly (Granovetter 1985).
More speciﬁcally, relying on contacts of collaboration part-
ners lowers the costs of new contacts and increases conﬁ-
dence that these collaboration efforts will be rewarding. In
addition, shared contacts act as a sort of social control by
increasing the costs of defection (Feiock et al. 2010). In
other words, organizational actors, as individuals, use com-
mon “friends” to reduce the uncertainty about the quality
and trustfulness of a new contact. Thus, if a political party a
and an interest group i collaborate, it is likely that another
political party b that collaborates with party a will also
collaborate with interest group i.
Finally, institutional opportunity structures refer to the
opportunity granted to collective actors that meet in in-
stitutional arenas of a decision-making process to developThis content downloaded from 130.092.
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms collaboration (Leifeld and Schneider 2012; Lubell et al.
2002; Sabatier and Weible 2007; Williamson 1991). Joint
participation in institutional arenas such as consultation
procedures and shared membership in working groups or
policy committees reduce transaction costs. First, joint par-
ticipation facilitates communication and the development
of mutual knowledge and trust between actors. The higher
the number of institutional arenas in which two actors meet,
the more they have a chance to learn about each other, to
develop mutual trust, and to form collaborative ties. Sec-
ond, actors’ exchanges in arenas dealing with speciﬁc po-
litical issues provide them with a thematic frame to develop
collaboration.
From these arguments we derive our ﬁrst hypothesis re-
garding the role of opportunity structures as collaboration
drivers.
H1. Social, relational, and institutional opportunity
structures increase the likelihood of collaboration be-
tween actors.
Differences in drivers of collaboration across
decision-making processes
Going one step further, we argue that drivers of collaboration
do not exert their effects in all policy sectors or decision-
making processes to the same extent. Instead, we assume that
the effects of some drivers vary depending on the charac-
teristics of these sectors or processes (Henry 2011, 367; Wei-
ble and Sabatier 2005, 195). On the one hand, factors such
as actors’ power or preference similarity are likely to foster
collaboration in any case, regardless of sector- or process-
related characteristics. Similarly, social or relational oppor-
tunity structures tackle endogenous network effects that are
unlikely to vary across political decision-making processes.
On the other hand, the inﬂuence of institutional opportunity
structures is presumably less systematic and more sensitive to
process-related factors. Institutional opportunity structures
are deﬁned by elements external to the collaboration network
itself, that is, by the institutional design of a decision-making
process. This, in turn, may condition their inﬂuence on col-
laborative tie formation.
More concretely, we argue that the inﬂuence of joint
participation in institutional arenas on the likelihood of col-
laboration depends on the importance of these arenas, that
is, on the extent to which they contribute to the output of
the decision-making process. While some institutional arenas
mostly serve for information provision and actor consultation
(“all talk, no action”; see Lubell 2004), others allow for ne-
gotiation, coproduction of solutions, and codecision (Verweij
et al. 2013). These differences affect actors’ payoffs of partic-009.056 on November 25, 2016 05:39:50 AM
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Johnson 2004). Actors are expected to invest more resources,
time, and collaboration efforts in arenas where policy outputs
are negotiated and coproduced than in simple consultation
arenas. Two actors meeting in an arena of little importance for
the policy outputs will have little incentives to create collab-
orative ties. By contrast, meeting in an arena in which im-
portant decisions are made will prompt actors to use the
opportunity and to establish collaboration.H2. The inﬂuence of institutional opportunity struc-
tures on collaborative tie formation depends on the
importance of the corresponding institutional arenas:
the higher that importance, the higher the inﬂuence
of institutional opportunity structures.2. Like Shrestha and Feiock (2009), we will be unable to determine
whether trust or mutual control ultimately causes the cross-sector de-
pendencies.Interactions between decision-making processes
The increasing complexity of policy problems has led to the
growing specialization of political actors and to a strong
functional differentiation of public policies along sectoral
lines. Accordingly, important theories of the policy process,
such as the advocacy coalition framework (Sabatier 1987)
or the punctuated equilibrium theory (Baumgartner and
Jones 1991), typically focus on single policy sectors. Yet schol-
ars are increasingly aware that considering policy sectors in
isolation from one another has strong limitations, as many
political actors are active in several policy sectors at the same
time. Therefore, they have started to study interactions be-
tween multiple sectors.
With respect to policy outputs, there is compelling evi-
dence of policy learning, diffusion, and spillover mecha-
nisms between sectors (e.g., Gilardi 2010; Jones and Jenkins-
Smith 2009). Interactions between sectors do not only regard
policy outputs but also hold for political bargaining and de-
cision making. Zafonte and Sabatier (1998) argue that actors
in overlapping and nested subsystems are functionally inter-
dependent. Interdependence, in turn, increases the need for
mutual coordination. Jones and Jenkins-Smith (2009) point
to the importance of policy entrepreneurs linking previously
unconnected issues. Lubell et al.’s (2010) concept of the ecol-
ogy of games emphasizes that actors are simultaneously ne-
gotiating issues in different, parallel institutional arenas, which
in turn inﬂuences their strategic behavior. Finally, authors
argue that coalition building in one sector is inﬂuenced by
existing coalitions in other sectors (Hoberg and Morawski
2008; Lubell et al. 2012).
In light of these arguments, focusing the analysis of col-
laboration on a single policy sector and neglecting the role
played by existing collaborative ties in other sectors appearsThis content downloaded from 130.092.
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms as a major weakness. To provide a more comprehensive
view of the determinants of collaboration, one needs to take
into account interactions between sectors. Actors are con-
nected through a multiplexity of collaborative ties across
sectors, and these ties are likely to inﬂuence each other
(Heaney 2014; Shrestha et al. 2014; Shrestha and Feiock
2009). Such a situation can be seen as a series of multiple
games, in which the payoffs in each individual game also
affect the payoff in the other game (Shrestha and Feiock
2009). First, parallel collaboration in a variety of sectors
creates opportunities for communication and the develop-
ment of mutual trust and control (Coleman 1988; Putnam
1995), which increases the odds that actors also collaborate
in the policy sector of interest. Second, not collaborating
with an actor with which one is already connected in other
policy sectors is risky, since this may endanger collabora-
tion in these other sectors, too.2009
andH3. The more actors collaborate in other, parallel
decision-making processes, the more they are likely
to collaborate in the decision-making process of in-
terest.DATA, METHOD, AND MODELS
Comparable network data on several decision-making pro-
cesses are rare, and gathering such data is costly and time-
consuming. In that sense, our data set is fairly unique: It
includes collaboration network data regarding the 11 most
important political decision-making processes of the years
2001–6 in Switzerland. These processes, which we selected
on the basis of a survey among 80 experts of Swiss politics,
constitute the eleventh pension reform, the program of
budget relief 2003, the extension of the bilateral agreement
with the European Union on the free movement of persons,
the bilateral agreement with the European Union on the
taxation of savings, the bilateral agreement with the Euro-
pean Union on Schengen/Dublin, the law on nuclear energy,
the law on the infrastructure fund, the new law on foreign-
ers, the reform of ﬁscal equalization and tasks distribution
between the federal state and cantons, the new constitutional
article on education, and the telecommunications act.
To identify the main actors involved in each decision-
making process, we used the classical combination of po-
sitional, decisional, and reputational approaches (see, e.g.,.056 on November 25, 2016 05:39:50 AM
 Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
Volume 78 Number 1 January 2016 / 67Knoke 1993, 30).3 This ensures comparability of actor se-
lection across cases and with earlier work. This delineation
does admittedly not include every single actor participating
in each policy process but concentrates on the main actors,
that is, the ones that were able to inﬂuence the policy
output. Data on the collaboration network regarding each
of the 11 decision-making processes were gathered through
251 semistructured face-to-face interviews—a minimum of
19 for the process on the taxation of savings and a maximum
of 26 for the processes on the free movement of persons and
the Schengen/Dublin agreement—with representatives of
the main collective actors (political parties, interest groups,
government and administrative agencies, etc.) participating
in the processes.4 Table 1 shows descriptive statistics on the
11 processes.
Exponential random graph models (ERGM)
To evaluate the impact of opportunity structures—and
other relevant variables—on collaborative tie formation, we3. Following the decisional approach, we identiﬁed the actors that took part
in the different arenas (e.g., policy committees, consultation procedure, par-
liamentary committees, etc.) of a given decision-making process. To this list, we
added the actors holding a strategic position in the Swiss political system (po-
sitional approach). Finally, we checked during the ﬁrst interviews conducted
with the senior civil servants responsible for the decision-making process that
no powerful actor was missing (reputational approach).
4. Only actors that participated in at least one other venue in addition
to the very open consultation procedure were interviewed. Most of the
interviews were conducted between February and July 2008.
This content downloaded from 130.092.
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms estimate exponential random graph models (ERGM; Robins
et al. 2007). ERGMs are explicitly designed for statistical
inference on network data (for applications in political sci-
ence, see, e.g., Cranmer and Desmarais [2011]; Fischer and
Sciarini [2015]; Gerber et al. [2013]; Leifeld and Schneider
[2012]). Observations on network ties are by deﬁnition mu-
tually dependent. The assumption that a collaboration tie be-
tween actors i and j is independent of any other collabora-
tion ties that actors i and j have with other actors in the
network is highly unrealistic. Instead, the probability of a
collaboration tie between two actors at least partly depends
on the structural properties of the network in which the two
actors are embedded. Standard regression models are unable
to take this dependency into account and would erroneously
attribute explanatory power to other independent variables,
instead of attributing them to endogenous network structures
(Cranmer and Desmarais 2011). In other words, with simple
ordinary least squares regression, the error terms would be
correlated across observations, standard errors would be too
small, and p-values for exogenous variables would be too op-
timistic (Leifeld and Schneider 2012).
In order to construct a model without assuming rela-
tional independence, the dependent variable of an ERGM is
the whole network as one single observation (Cranmer and
Desmarais 2011). The structure of the whole network is
modeled as a function of actor-level variables (node covar-
iates), dyadic variables (edge covariates), and endogenous
network structures. Endogenous network structures refer to
effects of network structures on the network itself, like ac-
tors’ tendency to reciprocate ties or close triangles (i.e., toTable 1. Process and Network DescriptivesProcess
Duration of
ProcessNumber
of ActorsDensity of
Collaboration
NetworkAverage
Number of
Ties per Actor009.056 on Nov
and Conditions (Share of
Reciprocated
Tiesember 25, 2016 05:
http://www.journalAverage
Number of
Collaboration
Ties in Parallel
Processes39:50 AM
s.uchicago.edu/t-and-Importance of
the Preparatory
PhaseEducation 1997–2006 20 .41 7.9 .49 1.15 .73
Infrastructure 2001–7 22 .38 8.1 .35 .51 .67
Fiscal equalization 1991–2004 24 .28 6.5 .35 .81 .64
Budget relief 2002–4 25 .30 7.2 .47 .78 .63
Nuclear 1998–2003 24 .28 6.5 .44 .51 .60
Pensions 1995–2004 23 .31 6.9 .46 .84 .60
Savings 2000–2005 19 .30 5.5 .46 1.12 .56
Foreigners 1995–2006 20 .27 5.2 .25 1.02 .55
Telecom 2000–2006 22 .43 9.0 .42 .39 .47
Persons 2002–5 26 .33 8.2 .55 .81 .47
Schengen 2000–2005 26 .33 8.2 .37 .61 .44
Average 7.7 years 22.8 .33 7.2 .42 .78 .58c).
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connected). The relationship between the probability of a
network m and the network statistics in G can be expressed
by the following formula, where V is the vector of k pa-
rameters that describe the dependence of P(Ym) on the net-
work statistics in G (Cranmer and Desmarais 2011; Hunter
et al. 2008):
P(Ym)p
exp

2okjp1 GmjVj

okmp1 exp

2okjp1 GmjVj
 .
As represented by the formula, ERGMs calculate the prob-
ability of observing the given network over all the networks
that could have been observed. Expressed as in the formula
above, the ERGM has an exponential family form log like-
lihood function. However, given the very high number of
possible network conﬁgurations, computing the exact maxi-
mum likelihood is too demanding (Cranmer and Desmarais
2011). Therefore, models are estimated using Markov chain
Monte Carlo maximum likelihood (MCMC-MLE), which ap-
proximates the exact likelihood by relying on a sample from
the range of possible networks to estimate the parameters
(Cranmer and Desmarais 2011).5 The iterative optimization
of the MCMC algorithm proceeds until there is little change
in the approximate likelihood function value, that is, when
the differences between the coefﬁcients in the observed net-
work and the average coefﬁcients in the sample of simulated
networks are no longer signiﬁcant ( p 1 .05; Cranmer and
Desmarais 2011). Model ﬁt is also assessed by comparing
the observed network to simulated networks.65. The MCMC algorithm proceeds as follows: in a given optimization it-
eration, the sum in the denominator of the likelihood function is approximated
using a series of networks sampled from the distribution parameterized with
those parameters that maximized the likelihood using the previous sample of
networks.
6. Technically, the comparison is based on a set of network statistics
not included in the model: p-values are used to check whether the observed
network statistics are not different from the simulated network statistics. A
common threshold used for assessing model ﬁt is a p-value 1 .05 (Hunter,
Goodreau, and Handcock 2008). The goodness of ﬁt (GOF) values reported
below (GOF indegree, GOF outdegree, GOF edgewise, GOF geodesic) indicate
the percentage of observed network statistics (e.g., number of nodes with
indegree 1,with indegree 2,with indegree 3, and so on) successfully simulatedby
the model for each of the four network statistics. Usually, p-values are indicated
for each observed network statistic for the four types of endogenous structures
(Hunter, Goodreau, and Handcock 2008). For space reasons, we indicate only
the percentage of successfully (p-value 1 .05) simulated network statistics for
each of the four types of statistics. Most models are able to simulate more than
85% of all statistics correctly, and, on average, the complete model including
collaboration in parallel networks ﬁts the data better than the alternative model
excluding it (see model A2 in the appendix, available online). Detailed GOF
ﬁgures for each single statistic are available from the authors on request.
This content downloaded from 130.092.
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms The outcome network: Collaboration
among collective actors
The outcome network comprises the directed collaboration
ties among the collective political actors involved in the re-
spective decision-making processes. To identify the collab-
oration network among actors, we asked our interview part-
ners to indicate, from a list of actors that participated in a
given decision-making process, those actors with which they
had collaborated intensely, that is, with which they had fre-
quent contact without necessarily agreeing on the substantive
policy issue at stake.7 Table 1 presents descriptive indicators
of the outcome networks. The density of the 11 collaboration
networks, as measured by the number of observed ties out of
the total number of possible ties, ranges from 0.27 to 0.43.8Independent variables and controls
We use actors’ joint participation in arenas of the pre-
paratory, preparliamentary phase of the decision-making
process as an indicator of the institutional opportunity struc-
ture. We asked the interview partners to indicate in which
institutional arenas their organization participated, from a
list comprising all arenas of the preparatory phase of the
decision-making process at stake (from 10 to 15 arenas per
process). On the basis of this, we constructed networks of
joint participation, where the strength of the tie between two
actors (edge covariate) is measured by the number of insti-
tutional arenas both actors participated in.
Endogenous network effects, namely, reciprocity and
transitivity, serve as indicators of relational and social op-
portunity structures, respectively (Leifeld and Schneider
2012). The reciprocity parameter informs about the actors’
tendency to reciprocate ties. Reciprocity exists if actor a
indicates collaboration with actor b and b reciprocates this
tie. Empirically, reciprocity in the collaboration networks
varies from a minimum of 25% to a maximum of 55%
(table 1). The GWESP (geometrically weighted edgewise
shared partners) and GWDSP (geometrically weighted dyad-
wise shared partners) parameters measure transitive closure7. Exact wording of the question: “Which actors did your organization
strongly collaborate with during the decision-making process x?” Ra-
tionales for collaboration can be the exchange of information, advice, or
resources; the coordination in a coalition; or the search for access to in-
ﬂuential actors (Weible and Sabatier 2005, 182). Given the absence of agree-
ment in the literature on the actual content of relationship that one should
focus on (Scholz et al. 2008), we deliberately refrained from specifying this
content and opted instead for a broad deﬁnition of collaboration.
8. The density of a network corresponds to the number of ties divided
by the total number of possible ties. It ranges from 0 (empty network) to 1.
009.056 on November 25, 2016 05:39:50 AM
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Volume 78 Number 1 January 2016 / 69and should be interpreted together (Hunter 2007). The
GWDSP captures the tendency of a dyad (i.e., of a pair of
actors that are collaborating or not) to have one or more
shared partners. It is a baseline effect that controls whether
any two actors in the network tend to have shared partners.
Once dyadwise shared partners have been controlled for, the
GWESP measures whether two actors that collaborate are
more likely than pure chance to have common partners (Lei-
feld and Schneider 2012).9
The variable (edge covariate) measuring collaboration in
other processes, which serves to test our third hypothesis, is
also based on the interview question used to construct the
outcome networks. It counts the number of other decision-
making processes in which two actors collaborate. It ranges
from zero to 10, but empirically actors have only 0.78 col-
laboration ties, on average, in other, parallel networks (ta-
ble 1).10
Four additional, exogenous variables identiﬁed as drivers
of collaboration in the existing literature are introduced as
controls. First, our measure of preference similarity is again
based on interview data. Actors were asked to select, from
the same list of actors participating in the process men-
tioned above, those actors with which they had converging
or diverging preferences about the policy project.11 This in-
formation is represented as a network whose ties express
preference similarity (1) or preference dissimilarity (21)
and is added to the model as an edge covariate term. Sec-
ond, we include two control variables representing ac-
tors’ power. One is reputational power (Fischer and Sciarini
2015), and it also stems from interview data: We asked our9. GWESP and GWDSP include a geometric weighting parameter; i.e.,
the number of shared partners per dyad is weighted. A low geometrical
weighting parameter of 0.1 for both parameters means that two actors are
unlikely to have a lot of shared partners and avoids model degeneracy
(Leifeld and Schneider 2012; Morris, Handcock, and Hunter 2008). De-
generacy results from the speciﬁcation of a model that is so unlikely to
have generated the observed network that the ERGM cannot be computed.
In most of these cases, the Markov chain moves to an extreme graph, i.e.,
either a complete (fully connected) or empty (entirely unconnected) net-
work, and stays there (Cranmer and Desmarais 2011).
10. Of course, for each decision-making process under study, col-
laboration in the other 10 decision-making processes captures only part of
what is going on in parallel. However, given that our study includes the 11
most important decision-making processes of the early 2000s and covers a
wide range of policy sectors, we can be conﬁdent that our variable “col-
laboration in other processes” is a reliable indicator of the broader rela-
tional structure. Further, table 1 shows that all processes do temporarily
overlap, at least between 2002 and 2004.
11. Exact wording of the question: “With which actors did your or-
ganization have convergent or divergent preferences with respect to the
decision-making process x?”
This content downloaded from 130.092.
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms interview partners to indicate which actors were—in their
view—very inﬂuential in the respective decision-making
process, again on the basis of the same list of actors.12 This
results in a binary matrix of reputation attribution. In ad-
dition, we introduce a dummy variable measuring formal
authority. The variable differentiates state actors from non-
state actors and relates to two effects in the models: state
actors’ outgoing and incoming ties (Ingold and Fischer 2014).
Third, our models control for the tendency of actors to
collaborate with actors of the same type. Such phenomena
of homophily are common in collaboration networks (Gerber
et al. 2013; Scholz et al. 2008). We group actors in ﬁve actor
types (state actors, political parties, interest groups, cantons,
and others) and include this variable as a node covariate. The
fourth control variable distinguishes the actors that partic-
ipated in many decision-making processes (the so-called
“generalists”) from those that participated in very few pro-
cesses (the “specialists”). It is included as a node covariate and
ranges from one to 11. We need this control variable in order
to test accurately the effect of collaboration in other policy
processes. Obviously, the number of other decision-making
processes in which two actors collaborate is likely to be higher
among actors that participate in several processes than among
actors that participate in a small number of processes only.
Regarding ﬁnally process-level characteristics, for reasons
of consistency with our indicator of institutional opportu-
nity structures, our measure of the importance of institu-
tional arenas focuses on the preparatory phase of legisla-
tion. While the preparatory phase is known as a major
decision-making phase in Swiss decision-making processes,
its importance nevertheless varies from one process to the
other (Kriesi 1980; Sciarini 2014, 2015; Sciarini, Fischer,
and Traber 2015). To assess the importance of preparatory
arenas we rely on a question asking our interview partners
to identify, from a predeﬁned list, the arenas that in their
view had been “very important” for the ﬁnal policy output,
that is, “where important decisions with respect to the pol-
icy output were taken.” Table 1 shows, for each process, the
aggregate share of respondents who mentioned the arenas
of the preparatory phase as being “very important.”RESULTS
Table 2 presents the results of the model including all var-
iables presented above for each of the 11 decision-making12. Exact wording of the question: “I would like to ask you to indicate
which actors were, in your view, very inﬂuential in the decision-making
process x.”
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Volume 78 Number 1 January 2016 / 71processes.13 Given that we present 11 different models, we
refrain from interpreting the size of effects and focus in-
stead on their direction and signiﬁcance. The direction of
the coefﬁcients indicates increasing or decreasing proba-
bilities of observing a collaborative tie.14 Entries marked
with an asterisk point to signiﬁcant effects at the conven-
tional level of p-values of .05 or lower. Starting with the
relational opportunity structure, the reciprocity parameter
is positive in eight networks and has no effect in three.
While relational opportunity structures do not prompt col-
laboration in all cases, the use of reciprocity as a criterion to
decide whom to contact nevertheless appears as a fairly
widespread strategy, one that holds in a variety of decision-
making sectors and processes.
Results are less clear-cut with respect to social oppor-
tunity structures. The GWESP term is signiﬁcant and pos-
itive in six networks but not signiﬁcant in ﬁve.15 In line with
earlier studies emphasizing the role of common contacts in
reducing uncertainty about the worthiness of a new col-
laborative tie, the social opportunity structure has a positive
inﬂuence on the creation of a collaborative tie in a short
majority of cases. However, in almost half of the cases, shared
contacts do not have the expected effects, which means that
social opportunity structures do not foster collaboration in
all cases.13. As an alternative, we could aggregate the data from our 11 sepa-
rate networks and estimate a pooled model. However, in order to test our
hypothesis regarding differences across networks, we would need to in-
clude a high number of interactions terms. We therefore opted for sepa-
rate models but nevertheless estimated a pooled model (see table A1 in the
appendix). Results are in line with those of table 2 but are of course less
precise. The fact that the pooled model does not capture differences be-
tween processes presumably accounts for the relatively poor model ﬁt,
which is much lower than that of the 11 networks taken separately—es-
pecially with respect to edgewise shared partners. As an additional test, we
followed Cranmer and Desmarais (2012) and excluded those networks
that had a higher density than others (education, telecom) or that were
different from others on the basis of a multidimensional scaling repre-
sentation of individual model coefﬁcients (Schengen). This does not affect
the results.
14. The size of effects, i.e. the odds ratio of observing a collaborative
tie if the independent variable increases by one unit, can nonetheless be
obtained by calculating the exponential function of effects, as in a logit
regression model (Hunter et al. 2008). For example, in the pension reform,
the probability that two actors collaborate increases by 30% (0.3, i.e., e.26 2
1) for each parallel decision-making process in which they collaborate;
their probability of collaborating increases by 13% for each venue they
participate in jointly. In the same network, the probability that actor a
collaborates with actor b increases by 264% if a considers b as inﬂuential.
15. The signiﬁcance and negative sign of the GWDSP parameters in
four networks show that in these networks, unconnected dyads with
shared partners are less frequent than expected in a random network. This
is one indicator of triadic closure, but the related and crucial GWESP
parameter is signiﬁcant in only one of the four networks.
This content downloaded from 130.092.
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms Institutional opportunity structures, as measured by
joint participation in institutional arenas of the preparatory
phase of political decision making, also have a signiﬁcant
effect in six out of 11 networks. In those six cases, the higher
the number of institutional arenas such as policy committees
in which two actors jointly participate, the more it is likely
that they collaborate.16 In the ﬁve other networks, however,
institutional opportunity structures do not have a signiﬁcant
inﬂuence on collaborative tie formation.
In sum, our results provide mixed support for our ﬁrst
hypothesis of opportunity structures as drivers of collabo-
ration. On the one hand, our cross-sector perspective backs
the ﬁnding of Leifeld and Schneider’s (2012) sector-speciﬁc
study that relational opportunity structures prompt collab-
oration and suggests that this ﬁnding has a broader validity.
According to our data, in most decision-making cases, ac-
tors show a propensity to reciprocate collaboration. On the
other hand, the effects of social and institutional opportu-
nity structures are not systematic and vary across decision-
making processes.
The mixed ﬁnding regarding institutional opportunity
structures was, however, not unexpected. In fact, our second
hypothesis explicitly bets on varying effects across processes.
According to that hypothesis, the importance of institutional
arenas in which actors meet conditions the inﬂuence of in-
stitutional opportunity structures on collaboration. Our data
tend to conﬁrm that expectation. As we can see from tables 1
and 2, joint participation in institutional arenas of the pre-
paratory phase of decision making fosters collaboration in
all six processes in which the importance of this phase is
deemed high (i.e., where perceived importance is higher than
average). Conversely, the institutional opportunity structure
has no effect on the creation of collaborative ties in the re-
maining ﬁve processes in which the importance of the pre-
paratory phase is lower than average.17
Thus, our results provide encouraging support for our
hypothesis that the inﬂuence of institutional opportunity
structures on collaboration is conditional on the importance
of the corresponding institutional arenas. The incentive func-
tion exerted by joint participation in the preparatory phase16. Results remain the same if we use a variable measuring joint
participation relative to the number of available arenas per process instead
of the absolute number of joint participations.
17. A closer look at table 2 shows that the ﬁve cases in which the
preparatory phase is less important are all to some extent Europeanized
(Fischer and Sciarini 2013; Sciarini 2014): the three bilateral agreements
with the European Union, which were to a large extent decided “from the
outside,” and the foreigners law and telecom act, where domestic working
groups and consultation procedures had more of a “window dressing”
character.
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72 / Drivers of Collaboration in Political Decision Making Manuel Fischer and Pascal Sciariniof legislation on the propensity to collaborate is weaker if
this phase is little important than if it is highly important. In
the latter case, actors can participate in codecision and co-
production of solutions, which gives rise to more intense
interactions. If actors are aware that the arenas in which they
meet will have an inﬂuence on the policy outputs, they invest
more time and resources and are more prone to establish
collaboration.18
Table 2 also highlights the strong importance of pref-
erence similarity and perceived power, which we introduced
as control variables. Both variables have a signiﬁcant and pos-
itive effect on collaboration in all 11 decision-making cases.
This result highlights the crucial importance of these two
classic predictors of collaboration. Further, while opportu-
nity structures absorb the effect of preference similarity in
Leifeld and Schneider’s (2012) sector-based study, our anal-
ysis of 11 different sectors shows that opportunity structures
and preference similarity are distinct and complementary
drivers of collaborative tie formation. By contrast, the other
control variables (formal authority, same actor type, and gen-
eralist) do hardly matter.19
Turning to our third hypothesis about the effect of col-
laboration between two actors in parallel decision-making
processes on their collaboration in a given process, table 2
shows that this effect is signiﬁcant (and positive) in seven
out of the 11 networks under study. This result lends partial
support to our hypothesis.20 Collaborative ties that have de-
veloped in parallel processes tend to favor mutual knowl-
edge and trust and to increase the risk of defection. As a
result, they provide actors with incentives to also collabo-
rate in the decision-making process of interest. Even with
only partial empirical support, this ﬁnding is important from
a theoretical viewpoint. The fact that collaboration patterns
in a policy sector are (partially) inﬂuenced by what happens in
other policy sectors indicates that the usual sector focus in18. Additional tests, not reported here, conﬁrm that the importance of
decision-making phases in which two actors meet matters. If, as a measure
of institutional opportunity structures, we use the number of joint par-
ticipations in the three most important arenas of the preparatory phase
(instead of the number of joint participations in all arenas of the prepa-
ratory phase), we ﬁnd that joint participation has a signiﬁcant, positive
impact on collaborative tie formation in nine cases out of 11.
19. The edges parameter controls for the number of edges in the
networks, i.e. for network density. It is negative in 10 networks, meaning
that actors have a negative tendency to send random ties.
20. Including the variable measuring collaboration in other networks does
not level out the effect of the classic drivers of tie formation such as power or
preference similarity. This suggests that this variable further adds to the ex-
planation of collaboration between political actors. The goodness-of-ﬁt tests
support this view, as including collaboration in other networks increases the ﬁt
of the model in more than half of the cases (six).
This content downloaded from 130.092.
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms policy studies is a limitation (Hoberg and Morawski 2008; Lu-
bell et al. 2010).21
Against our expectations, however, interactions across
sectors do not have a systematic inﬂuence on collaboration.
In four cases, their effect is not signiﬁcant. More work is
thus needed to account for these differences in effects be-
tween processes. As a ﬁrst hint we may point to the type of
policy at stake (e.g., Lowi 1972). In our data the seven cases
in which contacts established in other sectors inﬂuence
collaboration relate to either redistributive or constitutive
policies. By contrast, the four cases in which collaboration
in other sectors does not have the expected effect are either
regulative (telecommunication act, foreigners law, and law
on nuclear energy) or distributive policies (law on infra-
structure fund). In these policies, general values about how
society should be organized are of little importance. Actors
defending narrow interests mainly attempt to proﬁt from a
given policy output. This, in turn, might reduce their sen-
sitivity to cross-sector inﬂuences. While this explanation is
admittedly tentative, it opens a promising avenue for fur-
ther research.
CONCLUSION
On the basis of an exceptionally rich set of collaboration
network data covering 11 different decision-making pro-
cesses and the application of exponential random graph
models for network data, we contribute to the growing lit-
erature regarding the drivers of collaboration between ac-
tors in political decision-making processes. For both the-
oretical and practical reasons, existing studies have focused
on single policy sectors. This overlooks both the likely dif-
ferences in the patterns of inﬂuence between sectors and
the possible inﬂuences across sectors. On both accounts, our
comparative analysis across sectors makes a step forward
and provides compelling, if not overwhelming, support to
our hypotheses.
First, we analyze whether drivers of collaboration have a
broad relevance or whether they hold in speciﬁc policy
sectors only. On the one hand, our results show that pref-
erence similarity and perceived power have a far-reaching
inﬂuence. In fact, they are the only two factors that matter
in all 11 decision-making processes. Therefore, our Swiss21. The results of two additional models are provided in the appendix.
Model A2 excludes the collaboration across networks, whereas model A3
leaves out all types of opportunity structures. The results remain fairly
stable in model A2. By contrast, in model A3 the control variables mea-
suring the same actor type and formal authority (state actors) become signif-
icant in a high number of cases. This suggests that opportunity structures,
among others, allow actors of the same type to establish collaboration, as well
as collaboration to and from state actors.
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Volume 78 Number 1 January 2016 / 73data conﬁrm the overriding importance of preference similar-
ity and power as drivers of collaboration. Similarly, the rela-
tional opportunity structure also has a fairly consistent inﬂu-
ence on the creation of collaborative ties. Actors’ tendency to
reciprocate incoming ties and, therefore, to proﬁt from a cost-
less communication channel holds in most decision-making
processes included in our study.
On the other hand, the role of social and institutional
opportunity structures ﬂuctuates across policy processes.
While social opportunity structures tackle endogenous net-
work effects, it will be up to future research to identify the
conditions under which these effects foster collaboration.
With respect to institutional opportunity structures, our
analysis offers a plausible explanation for cross-sector varia-
tions. Our data tend to conﬁrm that the effects of institu-
tional opportunity structures vary according to the impor-
tance of the corresponding arenas. More speciﬁcally, joint
participation in institutional arenas fosters collaboration only
if these arenas are important for policy outputs. In the latter
case the higher the number of arenas two actors take part in,
the higher the likelihood of collaboration.
Second, our analysis sheds light on interactions across
sectors, which also contribute to the explanation of col-
laborative tie formation. Collaboration experience in other
processes helps actors to choose contacts that minimize
transaction costs and increase the expected beneﬁts, thanks
to the development of trust and mutual dependencies. Col-
laboration between actors in a given decision-making pro-
cess is thus more likely if these actors also collaborate in
other processes. True, the effects of collaboration across sec-
tors do not hold in all processes. However, the fact that they
show up in a majority of cases in a country like Switzerland
with strong sectoral differentiation and weak bargains and
political exchanges across sectors suggests that they have
a broader validity. Future research needs to check whether
our hint regarding the mediating role of the policy type is a
valid explanation for the differential impact of cross-sector
collaboration.
Our results have implications for the study of political
decision making and public policy more generally. First, the
variations in the effects of opportunity structures across
decision-making cases underscore the importance of a com-
parative analysis across sectors. Second, and relatedly, our
results call for an analysis of how the effects of opportunity
structures and other drivers of collaboration depend on
process-related or policy-related characteristics. Third, our
analysis provides some empirical support to the claim that
actors rely on previous or parallel experiences from other
policy sectors when choosing their collaboration partners.
Therefore, if one wishes to understand how actors behaveThis content downloaded from 130.092.
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms in a given policy sector, it seems important to also take into
account what is going on outside that sector.ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
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